


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WILL FRENCH CRISIS WEAKEN ADVOCATES OF MARSHALL PLAN?

FRANCE has become the center of the world for the makers of United States foreign policy. They attribute French strikes and industrial sabotage to the Communist Information Bureau, which has attacked the proposed American-European recovery program as a plan for "the economic and political subjugation of Europe through American imperialism," and has urged the Communist parties to "grasp in their hands the banner of national independence and sovereignty in their own countries." Seeing a connection between the Cominform manifesto, Communist leadership of the French striking unions, Communist sympathy for Russian aims, rivalry between the United States and Russia, and the prospective role of France in the recovery program, the State Department apparently regards the French disturbance as a planned threat to American security.

Thus French developments have caused the Administration to emphasize again the clear anti-Communist purpose of American foreign policy at a time when some political advisers have suggested to President Truman that he give the policy a broader basis. Disturbances in France underline the need for the recovery program. Although the strikes may be primarily political in motivation, they are justified in the eyes of the workers by the shortage of goods and the inflationary spread between levels of prices and wages that the "Marshall Plan" might correct. Yet the Administration notes signs that the French situation is creating new Congressional opposition to the long-term recovery plan, which the House and Senate are to consider during the regular session in January.

UNITED STATES AND FRENCH LABOR. The immediate hope of the Administration is that the program of Premier Robert Schuman for combating strikes will prompt the unions to reduce the power of the Communists in the French labor movement.

The Council of the Republic on December 6 completed legislative action on the bill which Schuman has sponsored to restore order to his country; it prohibits sabotage, incitement to sabotage, and incitement to strike. The French government justifies this law on the ground that the strikes are political, and the Force Ouvrière, comprising the Socialist opposition to the Communists in the Confederation of Labor, has circulated leaflets upholding the government opinion. The strike statute constitutes a direct attack on the influence of Communist majorities on executive committees of both the Confederation of Labor and the General Federation of French Civil Workers. Socialist Leon Jouhaux has opposed the strike program of his Communist colleagues on the Confederation executive committee, and Socialists, whom the Cominform manifesto harshly criticized, control four of the eleven Federation member unions. From the point of view of the United States, the overthrow of Communist labor leadership would reduce the possibility that Russia might gain an advantage over the United States through the French disturbances.

To encourage Schuman to pursue his stiff course by giving assurances that the United States would do what it could to support him in concrete ways, Secretary of State Marshall sent to Paris on December 3

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John Foster Dulles, his adviser for the German peace treaty negotiations at the Council of Foreign Ministers conference in London. The short-term objective of Dulles in Paris was said to concern those negotiations. A determination of the relative strength of the Communists and anti-Communists in France could throw light on the intentions of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in the treaty talks. A weakening of the French Communist position might mean that Molotov has been bluffing in his delaying tactics in London. The votes for the Schuman strike bill were overwhelmingly anti-Communist, 217 to 82 in the Council of the Republic and 409 to 183 in the National Assembly. At a press conference on December 5 Dulles commended France for its resistance to communism.

Dulles' long-term objective is reportedly to find out whether France will pursue policies friendly to the United States once the present disturbances have abated. Accordingly, he conferred not only with members of the government but, on December 6, dined with Charles de Gaulle, the likely head of some future government. Reflecting American official opinion that France is the European keystone to American security, Dulles on December 5 commented: "A catastrophe in France would be like the French debacle of 1940, which awakened all America to the danger of the Nazis." Dulles is of the opinion that communism is not today a native movement except in Russia, and by implication blamed "foreign penetration" for the troubles of France, which reached their dramatic peak while Maurice Thorez, head of the French Communist party, was visiting in Moscow.

CONGRESS AND FRANCE. The French situation is confounding present United States foreign policy in that the strikes have caused members of Congress to ask whether the United States should continue to supply goods and funds to Western and Southern European countries if the Communists can oust or frustrate existing governments. This question illuminates the weakness of the purely anti-Communist approach in foreign policy, for the economic interdependence of the United States and Western Europe is a persisting fact whether Communists or democratic governments are in power. Senator Saltonstall, Republican, of Massachusetts,

CHINA FEARS U.S. POLICY WILL REVIVE JAPANESE POWER

While the Council of Foreign Ministers continues its discussion of peace treaties for Germany and Austria at London, important diplomatic maneuvers are taking place with regard to a settlement for defeated Japan. The stability of the Far East and the world as a whole plainly requires a satisfactory conclusion to the state of war formally existing in Asia. But the question of treaty-making procedure for

on December 5 questioned whether the amount of goods France was losing through the strikes did not exceed the amount of help the United States intended to provide through the short-term aid program now before Congress. Foreseeing the possibility that Communists might rise to supreme power in Western Europe, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett suggested on December 5 to the Senate Appropriations Committee that the short-term aid bill authorize the President to terminate relief when it is "no longer necessary or consistent with the interests of the United States." He implied that America might retreat before Communist gains.

Although fear of the Soviet Union has stimulated Congressional support for Administration foreign policy proposals in the past, certain key members of the House continue to oppose the relief expenditures despite Communist activity in France. Senator Homer Ferguson, Republican, of Michigan, on December 5 asked Lovett to inform France and Italy that "one of our aims is to help them fight communism." But Chairman Taber of the House Appropriations Committee said on the same day that the \$590,000,000 which the Foreign Affairs Committee has recommended as short-term aid to France, Italy, Austria, and China is "too liberal."

The White House has begun already to question in private consultation whether appeals to fear might not prevent the United States from achieving the goal of policy, which is the establishment of political and economic stability abroad. The emphasis on fear without regard to other considerations can actually fortify the Communists. Out of consideration for the thrifty tendencies of the Eightieth Congress, for instance, the State Department last summer urged France to balance its budget in preparing for the European Recovery Program. The French government accordingly on November 5 reduced certain cost-of-living subsidies. This action widened the gap between income and price levels and helped to create an atmosphere conducive to strikes and sabotage. If the Administration could supplement its denunciations of Russia and communism with cogent explanations of the fundamental nature of Europe's economic problems, American understanding of the factors behind the recovery program might increase.

BLAIR BOLLES

Japan has struck a serious snag, especially on the issue of the veto power of the Big Four. So complex is the Far Eastern picture that the Nanking government, which is desperately seeking increased United States aid in its war with the Chinese Communists, finds itself closer to Moscow than to Washington on important matters relating to Japan.

The differences between the United States and the

Soviet and Chinese governments involve both procedure and policy. Washington wants a preliminary peace conference which will reach decisions by a two-thirds majority vote, without any veto rights. The Russians and Chinese, however, insist on the principle of Big Four unanimity, i.e., the veto. A subsidiary but related problem is to decide the membership of the conference. The United States has proposed that all governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission—the Big Four, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, India, the Netherlands and Canada—join in the parley. Nanking agrees on this point, but Moscow wishes the United States, Britain, China and the Soviet Union, meeting as the Council of Foreign Ministers, to do the preliminary work on the Japan treaty. Apart from China and the U.S.S.R., the members of the Far Eastern Commission have raised no objections to the American views on voting and membership, and the British Commonwealth countries have voiced strong support.

CHINA'S FIRMNESS. When the United States made its proposals last July 11, it presumably did not expect Moscow to agree, for Soviet views on the veto were well known. Moreover, abandonment of the veto in making peace in Asia would mark a significant departure from treaty procedures in Europe as well as from the rules of the Far Eastern Commission, which the Big Three created at Moscow in December 1945 to adopt policy decisions on Japan. The American position, from which the Russians dissented, was that there was no obligation to adopt the same voting practices in drafting a peace for Japan. Following Soviet rejection of the American proposals, it was widely reported that Washington would go ahead with preliminary peace discussions without the Russians. But before long it became clear that, while willing to attend the meeting suggested by the United States, Nanking, too, was standing firm in its objections. The Chinese held that if all the conference participants had an equal voice, China's role in the treaty making would not measure up to its sacrifices in the struggle with Japan. As a result of Nanking's attitude, the idea of holding an early conference without Russia had to be abandoned.

JAPAN AS SEEN FROM CHINA. Since the occupation of Japan has met with comparatively little criticism in the United States, many Americans may find Chinese views on the subject surprising. But the fact is that the Chinese, who know Japan well both historically and through recent bitter experience, are suspicious of American occupation policy. The view that the United States wishes to rebuild Japan as an industrial and military base, with possible grave consequences for China, is not confined to any one political group, but exists in virtually all Chinese circles from extreme right to extreme left. Criticism

of our Japan policy is found throughout the Chinese press, in reactionary, conservative and moderate publications alike.

A brief sampling of the Shanghai press this past October will indicate the Chinese temper on the issue of Japan. The *Hsin Wen Pao*, controlled by an extreme right wing group of the Kuomintang, charged on October 1 that continuance of present occupation policy in Japan would threaten China's security. The moderate *Ta Kung Pao*, long China's most distinguished newspaper, declared the following day that the United States "is feeding a ferocious tiger at China's front door." On October 4 the *Tung Nan Jih Pao*, a Kuomintang organ, warned the United States and Britain that to help Germany and Japan to recover before destroying the hidden economic foundations of militarism would arouse the opposition of all Allied countries in Europe and Asia. The *Hsin Min Wan Pao*, a government-supervised moderate newspaper, called General MacArthur pro-Japanese on October 13, and on the same day the *Ta Wan Pao*, reportedly connected with former Premier H. H. Kung, stated that, while admiring MacArthur's ability and prestige, it felt the Japanese had poisoned his thinking. Both statements were made in commenting on former Ambassador William Bullitt's proposal that MacArthur be sent to China to cooperate with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in an anti-Communist program.

NANKING AND MOSCOW. The Chinese press, of course, is basically a controlled press. Some of its criticism probably reflects official dissatisfaction with American unwillingness to provide the assistance Nanking desires and an effort to put pressure on the United States in evolving its China policy. Very likely the conflict of cliques within the Kuomintang also plays a part. And Chinese moderates, unable to express themselves freely on domestic issues, may welcome the opportunity to use Japan as a vehicle for discussing democracy and its international implications. But there is no mistaking the genuineness of Chinese criticism of American policy in Japan.

Nanking's official approach, however, should not be considered identical with the outlook of the press. The government is attempting to steer a careful course between Moscow and Washington, while taking into consideration its own problems and interests. Thus, Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh on November 1 was careful to dissociate himself from press criticism of MacArthur's policies. Nanking is influenced by a number of complex factors: fear that Chinese security and interests cannot be protected adequately without the veto; differences with the United States over reparations (for example, Nanking wants Japanese textile machinery, while the United States is opposed); the danger that peace

with Japan without Russia would sharpen Chinese-Soviet differences; dependence on the United States for further aid in the civil war; and the pressure of Chinese opinion, perhaps especially of businessmen who fear the competition of a resurgent Japan both in the Chinese home market and in hoped-for overseas markets. In connection with the U.S.S.R., it should be noted that Article 2 of the Chinese-Soviet treaty of August 1945 provides that neither party will conclude a separate peace with Japan. In an exchange of notes attached to the treaty the U.S.S.R. reiterated its recognition of the Central government as the national government of China. Although Nanking is dissatisfied with Moscow's observance of the pact, the Chinese government obviously wishes to avoid any action that might result in a Soviet denunciation of the treaty and a formal renunciation of the treaty obligations.

A SEPARATE PEACE WITH JAPAN? In a note of November 17 to the United States, Soviet Union and Britain, Nanking reiterated its view that the procedure of the Far Eastern Commission should be followed in discussing a Japanese peace, namely that decisions be reached by a majority, including all of the Big Four. Moscow replied on November 27, repeating its desire for a Foreign Ministers' conference, and suggesting January as a possible date, with China as the site. In its subsequent response Nanking adhered to the position it had already taken on procedure. Yet, there was no doubt that the Soviet proposal to hold peace discussions in China, at a time of great difficulties in the war with the Communists, appealed to the Chinese authorities. The suggestion was a shrewd Soviet diplomatic maneuver, since the United States had proposed that preliminary discussions be held in this country.

As long as Nanking maintains its present views, the United States will find it extremely difficult to undertake a separate peace conference. But even if some compromise of the Chinese and American positions should prove possible without a simultaneous compromise with Moscow, it would seem unwise to conclude peace with Japan in Russia's absence. It is true that a conference such as the one now going on in London would offer little hope of agreement. Yet a separate peace would give the Japanese the maximum room for maneuver in utilizing American-Soviet differences to Japan's advantage.

It is also doubtful whether a peace treaty could

work without Soviet cooperation, for the recovery of Japanese economy will depend to a significant degree on access to the iron ore, salt, soy beans and other products of continental Northeast Asia. Since North Korea is occupied by the U.S.S.R., the Chinese Communists control large parts of Manchuria and North China, and Moscow has a powerful treaty position in the Manchurian railways and the port of Dairen, the attitude of the Soviet Union—and the Chinese Communists—is crucial for Japan's future. All these facts suggest the importance of further discussion, with a view to producing a single peace conference to deal with the Japanese treaty.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities, by Grayson Kirk. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1947. \$2.00

After a clarifying survey of the subject covering the last quarter century, Professor Kirk presents the results of six regional conferences on teaching and research in international relations organized by the Council on Foreign Relations.

Understanding the Russians: A Study of Soviet Life and Culture. Edited by Bernhard J. Stern and Samuel Smith. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1947. \$2.75

A compendium of articles on various phases of life in the U.S.S.R. drawn from Russian, American and British sources, with no attempt to link them together into an integrated picture of the U.S.S.R. today. Texts of several basic Soviet documents are included.

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, Lake Success, N. Y., United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1947. \$10.00

A history of the United Nations and survey of its work, includes reprints of important documents.

China Handbook, 1937-1945, revised and enlarged with 1946 supplement. New York, Macmillan, 1947. \$6.00

Compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information, this is a useful reference work, although marked by the usual limitations of official surveys.

World on My Doorstep: A Venture in International Living, by Harriet Eager Davis. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1947. \$3.00

Mrs. Davis, whose husband for many years represented the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Geneva and Paris, gives a wise and at the same time entertaining account of her experiences in learning the need for continuous and effective American participation in world affairs. She offers helpful advice to other women about ways in which they, too, can contribute to the shaping of constructive American foreign policy and thus to the building of stable peace.

Decentralize for Liberty, by Thomas Hewes. New York, Dutton, 1947. \$3.00

Revised edition of a book which advocates, as a means of achieving economic freedom, the spread of population and industry, and the revival of community spirit.

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